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China in the U.S. Annual Threat Assessment 
February 14, 2009 in Watching the China Watchers by The China Beat | No comments 
News agencies have been reporting widely on the content of the U.S. intelligence community’s annual 
threat assessment, delivered Thursday by Dennis Blair (director of U.S. national intelligence) and 
peppered with language that hearkens back to the Bush era (of a whole four weeks ago, but, still, 
anyone else tired of references to the U.S. as the “Homeland”?). News stories have focused on the 
primacy given to the economic crisis in the report and the analysis of threats in the Middle East and 
what the report calls an “arc of instabilty” from South Asia through the Middle East. However, the 
report also contains several pages on China specifically (pp. 22-23), as well as mentions of China’s 
impact in Africa (pp. 34-5), its role in cyber attacks (p. 39), and Chinese environmental security (p. 
45). 
The full report is available at the website of the Director of National Intelligence. Below are excerpts of 
the included material on China. 
From the section on China: 
We judge China’s international behavior is driven by a combination of domestic priorities, primarily 
maintaining economic prosperity and domestic stability, and a longstanding ambition to see China play 
the role of a great power in East Asia and globally. Chinese leaders view preserving domestic stability 
as one of their most important internal security challenges. Their greatest concerns are separatist 
unrest and the possibility that local protests could merge into a coordinated national movement 
demanding fundamental political reforms or an end to Party rule. Security forces move quickly and 
sometimes forcefully to end demonstrations. The March 2008 protests in Tibet highlighted the danger 
of separatist unrest and prompted Beijing to deploy paramilitary and military assets to end the 
demonstrations. 
These same domestic priorities are central to Chinese foreign policy. China’s desire to secure access to 
the markets, commodities, and energy supplies needed to sustain domestic economic growth 
significantly influences its foreign engagement. Chinese diplomacy seeks to maintain favorable 
relations with other major powers, particularly the US, which Beijing perceives as vital to China’s 
economic success and to achieving its other strategic objectives. But Beijing is also seeking to build its 
global image and influence in order to advance its broader interests and to resist what it perceives as 
external challenges to those interests or to China’s security and territorial integrity. 
Taiwan as an area of tension in US-China relations has substantially relaxed since the 2008 election of 
Ma Ying-jeou. The new Taiwanese President inaugurated in May has resumed dialogue with Beijing 
after a nine-year hiatus, and leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are now cautiously optimistic 
that a new period of less confrontational relations has begun. Many outstanding challenges remain, 
however, and the two sides eventually will need to confront issues such as Taiwan’s participation in 
international organizations. Beijing has not renounced the use of force against the island, and China’s 
leaders see maintaining the goal of unification as vital to regime legitimacy. 
On the modernization of the PLA: 
Preparations for a possible Taiwan conflict continue to drive the modernization goals of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese defense-industrial complex. It will likely remain the primary 
factor as long as the Taiwan situation is unresolved. At the same time, we judge that China over the 
past several years has begun a substantially new phase in its military development by beginning to 
articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go well beyond China’s immediate territorial interests. 
• For example, China’s leaders may decide to contribute combat forces to peacekeeping operations, in 
addition to expanding the current level of command and logistic support. 
• China’s national security interests are broadening. This will likely lead China to attempt to develop at 
least a limited naval power projection capability extending beyond the South China Sea. This already 
has been reflected in Beijing’s decision in December to participate in anti-piracy operations off the 
coast of Somalia. 
Missile Capability. China continues to develop and field conventional theater-range ballistic and 
cruise missile capabilities that can reach US forces and regional bases throughout the Western Pacific 
and Asia, including Guam. China also is developing conventionally armed short- and medium-range 
ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads that could be used to attack US naval 
forces and airbases. In addition, counter-command, control, and sensor systems, to include 
communications satellite jammers, are among Beijing’s highest military priorities. 
Counterspace Systems. China continues to pursue a long-term program to develop a capability to 
disrupt and damage critical foreign space systems. Counterspace systems, including antisatellite 
(ASAT) weapons, also rank among the country’s highest military priorities. 
Nuclear Capability. On the nuclear side, we judge Beijing seeks to modernize China’s strategic 
forces in order to address concerns about the survivability of those systems in the face of foreign, 
particularly US, advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and missile defenses. We 
assess China’s nuclear capabilities will increase over the next ten years. 
And on Africa: 
China’s presence has grown substantially over the past decade. Total bilateral trade between China 
and the continent has increased from less than $4 billion in 1995 to $100 billion in 2008, but the EU 
and US still remain far larger economic partners for the region. China’s objectives are to secure access 
to African markets and natural resources, isolate Taiwan, and enhance its international stature, all of 
which it has made progress on. Nevertheless, China’s role has generated local resentment as Chinese 
firms are seen as undercutting African competitors in securing commercial contracts and falling short 
of standard local labor practices. Moreover, there is little discernible evidence of Chinese investments 
being used to incorporate Africa into the industrial “global value production chains” that are becoming 
the hallmark of integrative trade and FDI flows, especially in manufacturing in other regions of the 
world. 
On cyber attacks: 
We assess that a number of nations, including Russia and China, have the technical capabilities to 
target and disrupt elements of the US information infrastructure and for intelligence collection. Nation 
states and criminals target our government and private sector information networks to gain 
competitive advantage in the commercial sector. 
On the environment: 
China’s high incidence of chronic disease stemming in great part from heavy tobacco use threatens to 
slow economic growth by incapacitating workers and incurring heavy health-care costs. The health 
effects of environmental degradation are an increasing source of discontent in China. 
 
